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1. About ten years after the adoption of the ILC articles on
diplomatic protection, the UN General Assembly has included the
question of the elaboration of a Convention in its 2016 agenda (1). One
of the main current challenges of the law on diplomatic protection is
the scope of discretion when a State exercises diplomatic protection.
This question is linked to the ambiguous function of diplomatic
protection and to the difficulty of considering an injured individual as
the holder of rights to which a State gives effect by bringing its
international claims.
The existence for the State of nationality of a duty to exercise
diplomatic protection and of a correspondent right to protection for
the injured individual is controversial. There are provisions in the
Constitutions of certain Eastern European States guaranteeing diplo-
matic protection to their citizens for injuries suffered abroad, but it is
doubtful whether they confer an enforceable right (2). During the
drafting of the ILC articles and in recent consultations, some States
asserted that a State enjoys discretion on whether to act in protection
of its nationals, even though “subject to its internal laws” (3). In fact,
there is a tendency to limit States’ discretion under domestic law, such
(1) Resolution of the UN Assembly General 68/113 of 16 December 2013.
(2) For example, article 61 of the Constitution of Russia and article 36 of the
Constitution of Poland.
(3) This was the position of the United Kingdom, UN doc. A/CN.4/561, p. 28.
See also the position of Norway, on behalf of the Nordic countries, UN doc.
A/CN.4/561, p. 36, and of the United Kingdom, UN doc. A/C.6/68/SR.15, p. 9 (“the
apparently non-binding draft article 19 (Recommended practice) seemed inappropriate
for inclusion in a treaty and risked undermining the discretion which States had to
decide whether or not to exercise diplomatic protection”).
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as under the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the United King-
dom (4). Another view considered the existence of a duty to exercise
diplomatic protection when citizens have suffered gross violations of
human rights and do not have access to international organs capable to
afford reparation (5). The Constitutional Court of South Africa, for
example, declared that the government has a duty to exercise diplo-
matic protection in case of “gross abuse of human rights norms” to the
detriment of its citizens (6). However, the recognition of a right to
diplomatic protection under international law is still debated.
Assuming that States maintain a certain amount of discretion on
whether to exercise diplomatic protection, this does not imply that they
may freely dispose of any consequence of a wrongful act injuring one
of their nationals and, in particular, of a sum obtained from successful
claims. When States decide to exercise diplomatic protection, they give
rise to an expectation for individuals to obtain compensation.
This explains why, notwithstanding their reluctance to relinquish
discretion on whether to exercise diplomatic protection, States have
noted the importance to enhance the position of the individual as the
effective beneficiary of reparation (7).
This is also a consequence of the advent of human rights law,
which has broadened the function of diplomatic protection by en-
hancing the centrality of individuals. Diplomatic protection has pro-
gressively become an instrument for the protection of human rights
against violations committed by States other than the State of nation-
ality. In his fifth report on diplomatic protection, the special rappor-
teur John Dugard maintained that “the customary international law
rules on diplomatic protection that have evolved over several centu-
ries, and the more recent principles governing the protection of human
rights, complement each other and, ultimately, serve a common goal
— the protection of human rights” (8). This view is reflected in certain
(4) Regina (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, England and Wales
Court of Appeal, Int. Law Reports, vol. 126, 2012, p. 725, para. 106.
(5) This position was upheld by Italy (see UN doc. A/CN.4/561, p. 28).
(6) Kaunda and others v. President of the Republic of South Africa, Int. Law
Reports, vol. 136, 2009, p. 477.
(7) According to El Salvador, for example: “Today, however, diplomatic pro-
tection should be seen as just one of the various means of guaranteeing the rights of the
individuals in the international community”, UN doc. A/68/115/Add. 1, 30 August
2013, p. 6. See, also, the position of Poland UN doc. A/68/115, 26 June 2013, and that
of Saudi Arabia, UN doc. A/C.6/68/SR.15, p. 7.
(8) Yearbook of the Int. Law Commission, 2000, vol. II, p. 215, para. 32.
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comments delivered by Governments (9) and in the recent case-law of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of
Human Rights that will be discussed in further sections of this article.
It is not clear to what extent the ILC intended to confirm the
traditional function of diplomatic protection, according to which the
national State asserts its own right to have its citizens treated fairly by
third States. The question of the rights involved in diplomatic protec-
tion was deliberately left unsettled by the ILC when it adopted in
article 1 a deliberately ambiguous definition of diplomatic protection.
The commentary explains that the provision “is formulated in such a
way to leave open the question whether the State exercising diplomatic
protection does so in its own right or that of its nationals — or
both” (10).
Considering diplomatic protection as a procedure for implement-
ing rights pertaining to individuals — even if not necessarily defined as
human rights — would contribute to characterize the position of
individuals as actual beneficiaries of diplomatic protection. At the same
time, should the national State be considered under a duty to transfer
compensation, or a share of it, to its injured national, one may wonder
whether this means that the latter is the actual holder of the right to
reparation (11).
The wording of draft article 19 (c) of the articles on diplomatic
protection, saying that States “should” transfer the money, seems to
exclude that individuals have a right to receive compensation. It leaves
the question open to further developments of practice.
These questions will be discussed in order to ascertain whether
individuals hold a right to receive compensation and whether this leads
to overcome the traditional approach to diplomatic protection. A
clarification on this point is not only of theoretical importance, and may
have practical implications, such as those concerning the effects of a
State’s waiver of a claim concerning an injury to one of its nationals, or
the risk of multiplication of claims and double recovery.
(9) See, for example, UN doc. A/CN.4/561, p. 35 (Netherlands), UN doc.
A/68/115 (Poland), UN doc. A/68/115/Add. 1 (Colombia, El Salvador).
(10) Draft articles on diplomatic protection with commentaries, Yearbook of the
Int. Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two, p. 26, para. 5.
(11) The theory of a fiction founding diplomatic protection was argued by the
special rapporteur Mr. Bennouna in the preliminary report on diplomatic protection:
“In fact, the traditional view is based largely on a fiction of law” (Preliminary report on
diplomatic protection, by Mr. Mohamed Bennouna, UN doc. A/CN.4/484, p. 313, para.
21).
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2. Under traditional international law, aliens had to be granted a
minimum of rights. If the host State did not respect this standard, it
would incur international responsibility towards their national State.
Individuals did not have the right to bring a claim to compensation; the
national State was the only entity entitled to seek reparation for the
injuries suffered by individuals abroad. Since individuals were not
recognised as subjects of international law, the national State had the
exclusive right to make a claim for the benefit of its citizens against
ill-treatments and denials of justice perpetrated by host States.
This view was well illustrated in a 1931 award of the General
Commission for United States-Mexico reparation claims: “The relation
of rights and obligations created between the States upon the commis-
sion by one of them of an act in violation of international law, arises
only among those States subject to the international juridical system.
There does not exist, in that system, any relation of responsibility
between the transgressing State and the individual for the reason that
the latter is not subject to international law” (12).
Under the classical theory, the claimant State exercising diplo-
matic protection asserted its own right to ensure that its citizens are
treated by third States according to the international minimum stan-
dard. According to Vattel, “Quiconque maltraite un citoyen offense
indirectement l’État, qui doit protéger ce citoyen ...” (13).
Therefore, diplomatic protection was conceived as a procedure to
enforce the right of the State. It was not premised on a mechanism of
surrogacy, but on the assumption that the State suffers an indirect
injury, stemming from the violations perpetrated against its citizens.
The best known theorization of this approach was made by the
PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case: “It is an elemen-
tary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed
by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satis-
faction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of
its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right — the right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law” (14).
(12) Dickson Car Wheel, Report of Int. Arbitral Awards, vol. IV, p. 669.
(13) Le droit des gens, 1758 (reprinted, Washington, 1916, p. 309).
(14) P.C.I.J. Publications, Series A, No. 2, p. 12. The same approach was taken
by the ICJ in relation to international organizations. In the advisory opinion on
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the Court stated
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Under this theory, the State was entitled to claim compensation for
its own injury. This implied that the State exercises total control over
the claim. It could deal with it independently of the will of the
individual and waive it at any time for prevailing national interests. It
had, also, the power to dispose freely of the sum obtained as reparation.
All this was a consequence of the function of protection of rights of
States assigned to diplomatic protection according to the State-centric
framework of the international community.
The special link between the injury of the State and that of the
individual affected two aspects of the claim to compensation. One is
the requirement of continuous nationality, according to which the
injured individual must have been one of the State’s nationals from the
time of the injury to that of the claim. The bond of nationality justifies
the claim that the State derives from the wrongful act perpetrated
against individuals.
The other aspect is that the amount of compensation is normally
measured according to the harm suffered by the individual. This had
been envisaged by the PCIJ (15). Analogously, the ICJ has declared that
“in assessing this reparation it is authorized to include the damage
suffered by the victim or by persons entitled through him” (16). This
criterion has normally been adopted and has nearly gained general
application, even if the ILC articles on diplomatic protection do not
state it.
Some developments occurred after the second World War. The
advent of human rights law and international investment law strength-
ened the idea that rules of international law may confer rights on
individuals, even in the absence of procedural legal standing. More-
over, by virtue of some treaties, individuals themselves are entitled,
under certain conditions, to bring claims for compensation against the
responsible States. This weakens the traditional assumption according
to which only States may hold the right to receive compensation under
general international law.
that “in claiming reparation based on the injury suffered by its agent, the Organization
does not represent the agent, but is asserting its own right, the right to secure respect
for undertakings entered into towards the Organization” (I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 184).
(15) Case concerning the Factory at Chorźow, P.C.I.J. Publications, Series A, No.
17, 1928, p. 27.
(16) Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion: I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 184.
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Some authors considered that the development of human rights
law was rendering diplomatic protection obsolete (17).
However, in the field of human rights law dispute settlement
mechanisms present a limited effectiveness, since they are optional in
most treaties and accepted only by a minority of States. In most cases,
individuals lack direct legal standing to claim compensation for viola-
tion of human rights. Moreover, several human rights monitoring
mechanisms do not lead to binding decisions. Hence, in most cases, the
sole procedure to claim compensation for injuries suffered by individu-
als remains diplomatic protection (18). Indeed, diplomatic protection
has proved to be a useful instrument for claiming redress for human
rights violations (19).
In recent ICJ cases the claimant States asserted violations of human
rights (20) and in the Diallo case the Court expressly affirmed that “the
standard of treatment of aliens” covers, inter alia, “guaranteed human
rights” (21).
At the same time, the treatment of aliens has not been fully
absorbed by human rights law. In the LaGrand case, the ICJ asserted
that article 36, para. 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations attributes “individual rights” that the national State may
invoke before the Court. The relevant provision states that “the
competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner”. Although the Court
in the LaGrand case recognized that Germany vindicated a right
(17) WACHSMANN, Les droits de l’homme, Paris, 1999; SUDRE, Droit international et
européen des droits de l’homme, Paris, 2001, p. 27; GARCÍA AMADOR, State Responsibility.
Some New Problems, Recueil des cours, vol. 94 (1958), p. 472.
(18) CONDORELLI, La protection diplomatique et l’évolution de son domaine
d’application, Rivista, 2004, p. 5.
(19) As was noted: “Despite its compromised history, the main objective of
diplomatic protection is after all to remedy to an injury or damage produced to an
individual, exactly as in the case of human rights’ protection mechanisms” (MILANO,
Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the International Court of Justice:
Re-fashioning Tradition?, Netherlands Yearbook of Int. Law, vol. 35 (2004), p. 89).
(20) Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v.
US), Application of Paraguay of 3 April 1998, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
ipaus/ipausframe.htm; LaGrand case, Application Instituting Proceedings of 2 March
1999, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm; Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), Application of 9 January 2003,
http://www.icjij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorde/imus_application_20030109.PDF
(21) Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2007, p. 582, para. 39.
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pertaining to the individual, it did not consider necessary to deal with
the additional argument developed by Germany, according to which
the individual’s right in question was an aspect of due process and,
therefore, was a human right (22).
While it is certain that standards relating to human rights are
included in the treatment of aliens and elevate the level of protection of
aliens, it would be difficult to argue that the rules on the treatment of
aliens have been fully absorbed by human rights law (23). There are
some standards of treatment that cannot be invoked by States other
than the State of nationality.
Nevertheless, the recognition of rights of individuals which are
enforceable by their State of nationality is likely to affect the traditional
theory of diplomatic protection. Since diplomatic protection has been
progressively accepted as an instrument for the protection of rights
belonging to individuals, the question of the right to receive compen-
sation needs to be reconsidered.
3. The question of the right to compensation was left aside by the
ILC in the early discussion leading to the draft articles on diplomatic
protection. Different reasons influenced this approach. First, the issue
was considered to lay beyond the scope of the articles, for the reason
that the ILC did not intend to deal with the consequences of the
exercise of diplomatic protection, which were covered by the articles
on State responsibility. Moreover, in accordance with the traditional
view, the question of the distribution of the sum obtained as compen-
sation was regarded as pertaining to domestic jurisdiction.
In his preliminary report on diplomatic protection, the special
rapporteur Mohamed Bennouna considered the question as part of the
wider topic of the discretionary power to exercise diplomatic protec-
tion on the assumption that compensation follows the State’s choice to
resort to diplomatic protection. This approach is, also, reflected in
article 19 of the final text, which deals with both topics. However, the
same special rapporteur noted that with regard to the specific issue of
the disposal of compensation State practice after 1950 was significantly
evolving “towards the establishment of judicial review of the transfer of
(22) I.C.J. Reports, 2001, p. 494, para. 77. A different view was expressed by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its advisory opinion OC-16/99, 1 October
1999, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_16_ing.pdf.
(23) See VIERUCCI, La tutela di diritti individuali in base alla Convenzione di
Vienna sulle relazioni consolari: in margine al caso LaGrand, Rivista, 2001, p. 686 ss.
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 731
the sum received by States” (24). In particular, he referred to constitu-
tional provisions in States, such as China, Russia and other Eastern
European Countries, establishing the duty of the national State to
transfer the sum received for compensation to the injured individu-
als (25). Notwithstanding these premises, he considered it premature to
deal specifically with the topic and took the view not to suggest any
provision limiting the States’ discretion in the field of diplomatic
protection (26). The underlying theory according to which diplomatic
protection involves rights of States was not called into question.
It was not until the very last stage of codification that the ILC
reconsidered the question (27). As was remarked in the commentary to
article 19 (c), a significant amount of practice indicated that States
normally transfer compensation to the injured individuals. Some West-
ern States had introduced commissions for the distribution of lump-
sums obtained as a result of diplomatic protection in order to secure
“an independent and impartial quasi-judicial process” (28), such as the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, the
Foreign Compensation Commission of the United Kingdom and the ad
hoc commissions established by France for distribution of sums ob-
tained under specific agreements. These commissions are independent
bodies of a “quasi-judicial” character, rendering decisions on claims to
compensation made by nationals.
In spite of this trend, the ILC took a cautious approach, consid-
ering the scarcity of practice and the fact that the decisions of the
compensation commissions were not subjected to judicial review. For
this reason, article 19 does not recognise a right of individuals to
compensation and only says that States should “take into account the
views of the injured persons... with regard to the reparation to be
sought” and “transfer to them any compensation obtained... subject to
any reasonable deduction” (29).
However, the practice of the United Kingdom shows that although
the decisions of the compensation commissions are generally not
subjected to appeal, in certain cases some review has been guaranteed
(24) Preliminary report on diplomatic protection, by Mr. Mohamed Bennouna, cit.,
p. 315, para. 46.
(25) Ibidem, p. 316, para. 48.
(26) Ibidem.
(27) Seventh report on diplomatic protection, by Mr. John Dugard, UN doc.
A/CN.4/567, p. 23.
(28) See the fifty-first annual report of the Foreign Compensation Commission
for 2006, Cm 7188, para. 1.
(29) Draft articles on diplomatic protection with commentaries, cit., p. 75.
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in favour of individuals. In Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Com-
mission, for example, the House of Lords declared that the decision of
the Foreign Compensation Commission rejecting Anisminic’s applica-
tion for compensation had misinterpreted the criteria and was there-
fore a nullity (30). The finding of the Commission was therefore
reversed in favour of the individual.
The Sachsenhausen case provides another interesting example of
review. This case arose from complaints about the refusal of the
Foreign Office to pay compensation to a number of victims of Nazi
persecutions under the Anglo-German agreement of 1964. The case
was taken for investigation to the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration, which concluded that the British authorities had un-
fairly refused redress. Compensation was then awarded to all the
complainants (31).
While the two cases mentioned above were not considered by the
ILC, the Commission referred to the 1996 Lonrho Exports Ltd v. Export
Credits Guarantee Department to raise doubts on the existence of rights
of individuals. In this case, the High Court of Justice of England and
Wales held that the plaintiff, Mr. Lonrho, creditor of Zambia, could
not take advantage of the money received by the UK Government since
this was property of the State. However, this finding was due to the
circumstances of the case. In particular, the Court considered that
Lonrho had already been reimbursed 95% of the amount of its losses
under the export credit agreement, which was entered before the
conclusion of the lump-sum agreement. The High Court held that
Lonrho was not entitled, under the terms of the export agreement, to
recover the rest. However, this particular decision was based on the
terms of the export credit agreement and therefore should not be given
a general significance.
Some elements of practice confirm the emergence of a legal duty.
A decision of the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission,
for example, held that, whenever a State brings a claim on behalf of its
nationals, any sum paid for compensation does not become part of a
national fund. According to this decision, “it is not believed that any
case can be cited in which an award has been made by an international
tribunal in favour of the demanding nation ...in which the nation
receiving payment of such award has, in the absence of fraud or
(30) 2 AC 147 [HL].
(31) See O’HARA, The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, The
Foreign Office, and the Sachsenhausen Case, 1964-1968, The Historical Journal, 2010, p.
771.
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mistake, hesitated to account to the national designated, or those
claiming under him, for the full amount of the award received” (32).
The practice of the United States is in line with this construction.
The United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has admin-
istered various programmes of compensation, including claims for
losses suffered by nationals as a result of military operations, national-
izations and other takings of property by foreign governments or other
unjust damages suffered by United States nationals (33). The Commis-
sion has the function of adjudicating claims and issuing final decisions
on distribution of compensation. It also provides upon request tech-
nical assistance to the United States Government in conducting inter-
national claims settlement negotiations and, also, in evaluating the
proposal of new claims legislation. The Commission normally examines
standard forms of injured nationals and, if necessary, seeks additional
information or evidence on essential requisites (such as United States
nationality, ownership...). It then issues a “proposed decision” that is
forwarded to the claimant who has a “right” to file an objection in
writing if he or she believes that there are grounds for a more
satisfactory decision. He or she may also request an oral hearing to
present evidences and arguments. Thereafter, the Commission renders
a final decision but petitions to reopen the case may be allowed in
favour of individuals. The whole procedure seems to be designed to
favour the claimants to obtain compensation. The activity of the
Commission intensified following the increasing number of compensa-
tion programmes (34). Recently, it issued a final report on the first and
second programme on Libya based on the agreement concluded in
2008 which included a provision for the settlement of United States
nationals’ claims arising out of terrorist acts (35). Other programmes of
the Commission are still pending and there are future programmes
already under consideration (36).
At the same time, the United States legislation provides for the
right of the State Department to be reimbursed for costs arising from
diplomatic protection. In particular, the Department might deduct and
(32) US-German Mixed Claims Commission, 31 December 1928, Reports of Int.
Arbitral Awards, vol. VII, p. 152.
(33) Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 2010 Annual Report,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/annrep10.pdf, 10-16, 40-42.
(34) BEDERMAN, State-to-State Espousal of Human Rights Claims, Virginia Journal
of Int. Law, 2011, p. 8.
(35) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/annrep13.pdf, p. 6.
(36) See the Proposed claims agenda for the commission public meeting of 11
February 2016, https://www.justice.gov/fcsc.
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retain 1,5% of payments of at least 100,000 dollars and 1% of
payments above 5 million dollars received from foreign governments as
a result of the pursuit of claims on behalf of United States nationals (37).
The sum so retained flows into the International Litigation Fund
available for expenses relating to preparing or prosecuting proceedings
before an international tribunal or a claim against a foreign govern-
ment.
This practice explains why the ILC inserted in article 19 (c) on
diplomatic protection the provision according to which a State may
retain “reasonable deductions” from the sum obtained in compensa-
tion (38). However, this retention should be measured against the costs
effectively suffered by the State.
The elements discussed above show that State practice has consis-
tently evolved, even after the adoption of the draft articles on diplo-
matic protection, toward accepting that individuals are the effective
beneficiaries of the sum obtained in compensation.
During the elaboration of the draft articles, statements made by
Governments suggested that the question was no longer considered as
an internal matter of the State. Austria, for example, stated that “a
further issue that deserves particular consideration is the problem of
the relation between the individual whose rights are protected and the
State exercising the right to diplomatic protection... it should be
ensured that the injured individual in whose interest the claim was
raised will benefit from the exercise of diplomatic protection” (39). The
emergence of an obligation to distribute sums to the aggrieved indi-
viduals has been described by another State in the following terms: “the
established principle on which international practice used to be based
required that international reparation for injury was always owed to the
State and not to the individual... In modern times, however, this
principle has come under examination in many States, which acknowl-
edge that there is some obligation on them to disburse compensation
received to the injured national and that the injured individual in whose
interest the claim was raised should benefit from the exercise of
diplomatic protection” (40).
(37) House Report 107-671, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003, sec. 203, http://thomas.loc.gov/cpquery.
(38) Yearbook of the Int. Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two, p. 100, para.
7.
(39) UN doc. A/CN.4/561, para. 5, p. 35.
(40) See the position of Kuwait, UN doc. A/CN.4/575, 18 August 2006, p. 70.
See also the position of New Zeland at the 10th meeting of the Sixth Committee in the
same year, http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/gal3303.doc.htm.
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The same attitude results from comments delivered in the latest
consultation launched by the Sixth Committee on the possible conclu-
sion of a convention on diplomatic protection (41). A number of States
endorsed the “recognizable trend” towards giving individuals a more
significant role in diplomatic protection and considering that the latter
may evolve in a human rights protection instrument through which
States ensure “their nationals’ rights” (42). It might also be meaningful
that those States that had criticised article 19 for limiting their discre-
tion on deciding whether to exercise diplomatic protection have not
questioned the paragraph concerning the disposal of compensation in
favour of the victims (43).
The progressive recognition that individuals may hold rights under
current international law and, in particular, under the law on the
treatment of aliens has been influencing the States’ attitude toward
compensation and emphasizing the position of the individuals as the
ultimate beneficiaries. By perceiving to act on behalf of individuals,
States are gradually recognizing to be bound to transfer compensation
to the aggrieved individuals. Theoretically, this is a normal conse-
quence of the general principle prohibiting unjustified enrichment,
which is common to most domestic legal systems. It has also been
applied by international arbitrators in order to reverse situations where
accretion of wealth of one party to the detriment of another party did
not have legal justification (44). As diplomatic protection is increasingly
considered to be exercised on behalf of individuals, the State of
nationality has no legal justification for retaining the money paid in
compensation. Any retention could be qualified unfair enrichment to
the detriment of its nationals and would be considered legally unjus-
tifiable.
(41) See, for example, the comment of Lebanon arguing the need for a specifi-
cation of the “legal consequences for persons and assets” granted diplomatic protection
(UN doc. A/68/115, 26 June 2013).
(42) See the comments of Portugal (UN doc. A/C.6/68/SR.15, 15 January 2014)
and Poland (UN doc. A/68/115, 26 June 2013).
(43) See, for example, the view of the delegates of the United Kingdom (UN doc.
A/68/115, 26 June 2013) and of El Salvador (UN doc. A/68/115 Add. 1, 30 August
2013).
(44) It has been described as a “borderline concept between law and ethics”
which derives from various judicial techniques that have been employed to counter-
balance situations where the enrichment of a party was unfair (O’CONNELL, Unjust
Enrichment, American Journal of Comparative Law, 1956, p. 4). See, for example, the
Edna case in American Journal of Int. Law, 1940, p. 737. For a general view of
unjustified enrichment as a principle of international law see SCHREURER, Unjustified
Enrichment in International Law, American Journal of Comparative Law, 1974, p. 281.
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4. The drafting of recent lump-sum agreements confirms the
increasing centrality of individuals as beneficiaries of compensation. At
the same time, there are still elements of ambiguity. In particular, these
agreements normally provide for the power of the State to dispose
freely of the sums and include a waiver clause, which may preclude
future claims on the same subject matter.
In principle, provisions declaring that the State has the exclusive
right to distribute the sums might seem ambiguous because they could
either refer to the choice of the criteria for eligibility, without ques-
tioning that individuals are the effective beneficiaries of the agree-
ments, or imply that the sums are property of the State. According to
the first interpretation, they would aim at preventing the counterpart
from interfering in the distribution of the sums, while, in the latter
meaning, they could also prevent an individual from claiming a share of
compensation under the agreement.
In a controversial passage of the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities
judgment, the ICJ held that, “where the State receiving funds as part of
what was intended as a comprehensive settlement in the aftermath of
an armed conflict has elected to use those funds to rebuild its national
economy and infrastructure, rather than distributing them to individual
victims amongst its nationals, it is difficult to see why the fact that those
individuals had not received a share in the money should be a reason
for entitling them to claim against the State that had transferred money
to their State of nationality” (45). This reasoning seems to support the
second interpretation of the clause, implying a wider scope of State’s
discretion.
However, a significant number of recent lump-sum agreements
specify which “individuals” (who are nationals of the claimant States)
are eligible, implying that they are the actual beneficiaries. An agree-
ment concluded in 2015 between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the French Republic, for example, refers
expressly to the individuals as “beneficiaries” of the sums paid for
compensation (46).
The European Court of Human Rights considered that provisions
reserving to the State the power to distribute the sums do not prejudge
the position of individuals as holders of the right to receive a share of
compensation. In the Beaumartin v. France case related to the agree-
(45) Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening),
I.C.J. Reports, 2012, p. 99, para. 102.
(46) Agreement on Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-Related
Deportation from France Who Are not Covered by French Programs.
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ment under which the French Government obtained reparation from
Morocco for damages sustained by French nationals, the Court held
that the French nationals could assert a right to a share of compensa-
tion “even though it was for the French authorities to determine,
through a compensation committee set up by decree, how the com-
pensation was to be apportioned” (47).
The Beaumartin case also supports the view that lump-sum agree-
ments involve rights of individuals. This basic assumption should also
affect the interpretation of provisions under which a State provides for
the waiver of a claim. In this regard, the question arises whether a
waiver prejudices those claims that might be brought by, or on behalf
of, individuals who have not effectively benefited from compensation
schemes.
Under a general principle of law, a waiver does not affect rights
pertaining to persons other than its author, except in case of their
acceptance. Therefore, assuming that individuals hold a right to receive
a share of compensation implies that their consent is required in order
to extinguish the claim. For this reason, States may not validly waive a
claim that individuals themselves — or States other than the State of
nationality — may prefer in order to seek redress for the injuries that
they have suffered from the wrongful act, except when they have
expressly or tacitly accepted the waiver. The conferral of a share of
compensation, for example, may entail acquiescence and trigger the
effect of the clause. Instead, individuals should not be affected by a
waiver, when they have not given their consent.
According to this principle, the settlement of the case by the State
of nationality affects only the position of this State and of those
individuals who have been effectively compensated. On the contrary,
the waiver should not impair the rights of those individuals who have
not benefited from the agreement with the consequence that they could
always seek redress toward the State responsible for its wrongful act.
Recent practice supports this construction. An example is given by
article 6, para. 2, of the agreement between the Government of the
United States and the Government of the French Republic which
declares that the settlement exhausts any claim regarding holocaust in
the relationship between the contracting States. According to article 6,
para. 3, “any payment to an individual under this agreement” consti-
tutes a final comprehensive settlement of all holocaust deportation
claims “by that individual”. This wording, that frequently appears in
(47) Beaumartin v. France, app. no. 15287/89, para. 28.
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recent agreements, suggests that, in principle, the scope of the State’s
waiver only affects those victims that have effectively obtained a share
of compensation.
The principle according to which the waiver does not automati-
cally frustrate the claim of individuals who unfairly remained excluded
from the compensation programme was also upheld by the Korean
Supreme Court (48). On the question of claims of Korean victims of
forced labour, in a judgment under the 1965 Settlement agreement
between Korea and Japan, this Court affirmed that it would be contrary
to principles of modern law to consider that the national State can
extinguish its citizens’ rights without their consent by concluding a
treaty.
Lump-sum agreements involve rights pertaining to individuals
even in cases where the economic condition of the responsible State
could prevent individuals from receiving a sum proportional to the
injury suffered. In certain cases, the large number of claims deriving
from war conflicts or crimes against humanity cannot be comprehen-
sively satisfied, without seriously undermining the process of peace-
building and the economic recovery of the countries involved. As the
recent experience of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission shows,
full reparation may be limited for humanitarian purposes and compen-
sation considerably reduced in order to ensure that people are not
deprived of their basic needs of subsistence (49).
In similar situations, the need arises for finding alternative ways of
reparation for injuries caused by serious violations of humanitarian law
when compensation might be smaller than what, in the abstract, should
be owed to the victims. Satisfaction may be invoked in alternative or in
addition to compensation. It was, for example, requested in addition to
compensation by the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case
brought against Uganda. In its memorial to the Court, the DRC asked
for “un montant ...global ou plus clairement décomposé en une indem-
nisation couvrant les dommages stricto sensu et une satisfaction com-
prenant des dommages-intérêts correspondant à la gravité des viola-
tions, de manière à compenser l’atteinte à l’honneur de la République
démocratique du Congo mais aussi de dissuader l’Ouganda de ré-
(48) Park and ors v Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited, Appeal Judgement, 24
May 2012, para. 60, in Oxford Reports of International Materials, ILDC 1909 (KR2012).
(49) Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission - Final Award - Ethiopia’s Damages
Claims, in Reports of Int. Arbitral Awards, vol. XXVI, 2009, p. 649.
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cidiver à l’avenir” (50). In this case, the global sum claimed as satisfac-
tion for injuries suffered by individuals should be employed to restore
moral damages.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has elaborated exten-
sively the concept of non-pecuniary damages and its case-law offers
interesting elements (51). In cases where the payment of compensation
exceeds the possibilities of the respondent State, the Court evaluates
the actions taken as compensatory measures, which “offer the injured
party a satisfaction that transcends the financial sphere” (52). These may
include investigations, inquiries and other initiatives taken in order to
establish the truth, the publication and public dissemination of the
judgement, the undertaking of projects to recover the historical
memory, including the naming of streets after the victims or the
establishment of monuments in their memories (53). The appropriate
compensatory measures might vary according to the circumstances of
the case, the attitude of the State, the violations involved but they
should, in any case, be designed to benefit the aggrieved individuals.
5. Recent international jurisprudence contributes to shape a right
of individuals to receive compensation from the responsible State.
This tendency diverges from the traditional approach according to
which reparation was designed to restore rights of States, even though
compensation might have been calculated on the basis of the damages
suffered by the injured individuals (54).
In particular, the traditional approach was challenged by the 2012
Diallo judgment on compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of
the Congo to the Republic of Guinea (55). In this case the Court
affirmed that compensation that was owed by the respondent State to
Guinea was intended to provide reparation for the individual’s in-
(50) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Mémoire de la République Démocratique du Congo, 2000, para.
6.77.
(51) Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala.
Reparations and Costs, Judgment of May 26, 2001, Series C, No. 77, para. 84.
(52) Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia. Merits, Reparation and
Costs, Judgment of September 1, 2010, Series C, No. 217, para. 281.
(53) Ibidem, paras. 239-254.
(54) Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, cit., p. 28; Reparation for injuries
suffered in the service of the United Nations, cit., p. 184.
(55) Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2012, p. 324.
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jury (56). The Court’s statement implies that Mr Diallo was the subject
injured by the wrongful act and, therefore, entitled to receive compen-
sation. According to this interpretation, not only should compensation
be measured against the damages suffered by the individual, but, also,
the latter should benefit from compensation.
The recent Cyprus v. Turkey judgement of the European Court of
Human Rights reinforces this finding (57). The Court quoted the ICJ
Diallo judgment and held, for the first time, that article 41 of the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on “just satisfaction”
applies also to certain inter-State applications based on article 33 of the
ECHR. The Court argued that there may be two different kinds of
inter-State complaints. Contracting States have the right either to
address systemic failures of other contracting States, or to protect the
right of a group of identifiable individuals who are injured by the
alleged violations. In the first case, the applicant State complains about
general issues regarding another State (like administrative practice) and
vindicates the “public order of Europe” (58). In the latter case, the State
contests violations committed against certain individuals and may be
entitled to receive compensation “for the benefit of individual vic-
tims” (59). The Court spelt out clearly that it is the individual, and not
the State, who is directly harmed and primarily “injured” by a violation
of one or several Convention rights (60). Then, after referring to the
analogy between diplomatic protection and human rights complaints,
the Court concluded that “just satisfaction” “should always be done for
the benefit of individual victims” (61).
The practice of inter-state applications for violations of human
rights is limited. Cyprus v. Turkey is the first ECHR inter-state case
where the question of compensation was raised. A similar principle was
earlier affirmed by the African Commission on Human Rights. In the
Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda case, the Commission recom-
mended that “adequate reparations be paid, according to the appro-
priate ways, to the Complainant State for and on behalf of the victims
...which suffered these violations” (62).
(56) Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Compensation, Judgment, cit., p. 344, para. 57.
(57) Cyprus v. Turkey, appl. no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014.
(58) Cyprus v. Turkey, appl. no. 25781/94, 12 May 2014, paras. 43-44.
(59) Ibidem, para. 47.
(60) Ibidem, para. 45.
(61) Ibidem.
(62) Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, case 227/99, 23
May 2003, http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/227.99/view/en/#holding.
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Certainly, human rights complaints cannot be identified with
diplomatic protection stricto sensu, since contracting States may bring
a claim concerning the violation of human rights for individuals
regardless of nationality and even against their State of nationality. At
the same time, considering their similar function, inter-State human
rights applications might be considered as a form of “disguised diplo-
matic protection” (63). In both cases the State may vindicate injuries
and violations of rights pertaining to individuals, who, for this reason,
should be entitled to receive compensation from successful claims.
According to the judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey, the claimant State
will have to transfer the money paid for compensation to the victims
under the control of the Committee of Ministers (64). The latter, that is
currently examining the case, has recalled that “the Court indicated
that these amounts should be distributed afterwards by the Govern-
ment of Cyprus to the individual victims under the supervision of the
Committee of Ministers within eighteen months of the date of the
payment or within any other period considered appropriate by the
Committee of Ministers” (65).
Given the general wording of the judgment, its impact on future
similar cases should also be considered. One of these may be the case
of Georgia v. Russia, concerning the arrest, detention and expulsion
from Russia of large numbers of Georgian nationals. The Grand
Chamber, in its 2014 judgment on the merits, reserved the question of
the application of article 41, holding that it was not ready for decision
and inviting the Parties to submit their observations on the matter (66).
Similarly, the question might arise in the two Ukraine v. Russia cases,
lodged in 2014, the first one concerning the events leading up to and
following the assumption of control by the Russian Federation over the
Crimean peninsula from March 2014 (67), and the second regarding the
alleged abduction and transfer to Russia of three groups of chil-
(63) FLAUSS, Protection diplomatique et protection internationale des droits de
l’homme, Revue suisse de droit int. et de droit européen, 2003, p. 14. According to this
author: “En effet, de manière occasionnelle, l’exercice du recours inter-étatique devant
une instance de contrôle établie par un traité relatif aux droits de l’homme tend
fortement à se rapprocher, ne serait-ce d’ailleurs que du point de vue des intentions de
l’Etat requérant, à l’exercice de la protection diplomatique”.
(64) PUSTORINO, La riparazione dei danni nella sentenza della Corte europea nel
caso Cipro c. Turchia, Rivista, 2014, p. 1119.
(65) Memorandum prepared by the Department for the Execution of Judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights, H/Exec (2014)8, 25 November 2014.
(66) Georgia v. Russia, app. no. 13255/07, 3 July 2014, p. 58, para. 238.
(67) Ukraine v. Russia, app. no. 20958/14.
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dren (68). Unavoidably, the prospect of obtaining “just satisfaction”
encourages inter-state applications and may, also, lighten the European
Court’s judicial load from numerous individual claims. At the same
time, as will be discussed in the next section, the ambiguous relation-
ship between inter-state and individual applications could determine
the risk of duplication and incoherence among decisions on the same
matters.
6. The developments described in the previous sections challenge
the traditional view that the State exercising diplomatic protection is
“specially affected” by the wrongful act and, therefore, is asserting its
own right to compensation.
This question was left open by the ILC. The articles on interna-
tional responsibility of States state in article 33, para. 2, that the
provisions on the content of responsibility do not cover “any right,
arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may
accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State”. This text
does not rule out the possible existence of the right of individuals to
compensation, but specifies that the matter is not covered by the
articles. An implicit reference to individuals may be found in article 48,
providing that any State other that the injured State is entitled to claim
compensation “in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries
of the obligation breached” (69). The reference to possible beneficiaries
of compensation clearly includes the individuals injured by the inter-
nationally wrongful acts. However, it is doubtful whether article 48 is
relevant for diplomatic protection since, according to the traditional
view, the claimant State is considered the injured subject. In the
Mavrommatis case, the presence of interests of individuals was said to
be irrelevant from a legal point of view. According to the Permanent
Court “the question, therefore, whether the . . . dispute originates in an
(68) Ukraine v. Russia II, app. no. 43800/14.
(69) According to an author, “one can hardly infer from the use of the word
‘beneficiaries’ the conclusion that the affected non-States entities, unlike the affected
States, do not hold a right to compensation” (CANNIZZARO, Is There an Individual Right
to Reparation? Some Thoughts on the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case, in Unité et
diversité du droit international - Ecrits en l’honneur du Professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy
(Alland, Chetail, de Frouville, Vinuales eds.), Leiden, 2014, p. 496). For a critical
appraisal of the wording of draft article 48 and of its relation to draft article 44 see
PAPA, Protezione diplomatica, diritti umani e obblighi erga omnes, Rivista, 2008, p. 669
ss. See also CRAWFORD, The Standing of States: a Critique of Article 40 of the ILC’s Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, in Judicial Review in International Perspective (Ande-
nas, Fairgrieve eds.), The Hague, London, Boston, 2000, p. 23.
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injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many
international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint” (70).
Recently, this approach has been questioned by some authors who
have recognised that diplomatic protection involves a “plurality of
interests” (71) and that there may be rights and injuries of individuals
alongside those of claimant States (72). Yet, theoretically, this might not
necessarily exclude that claimant States are “specially affected” (73).
Even those authors arguing that diplomatic protection is based on
a fiction, whereby the rights and injuries at stake are those of the
individuals and the State acts, in reality, as a mere representative of
them, maintained that the fiction should be preserved in the interest of
the individuals. According to this opinion, given that individuals have
few remedies under current international law, it would be important to
consider that the State is directly injured by the wrongful act and
entitled to receive compensation (74). Yet, there is no evidence that the
fiction would encourage States to claim compensation, especially con-
sidering the trend toward the recognition of a right of individuals to
receive compensation. Instead, it is evident that the fiction may repre-
sent an obstacle to the compensation of individuals’ injuries and
precludes reparation when the national State has waived the claim (75).
A different solution would be to consider that the rights involved
in diplomatic protection depend on the State’s presentation of the
claim. In the Avena case, for example, the ICJ affirmed that the
claimant State may submit a claim “in its own name” for the “violation
of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the
violation of individual rights” (76). However, the Court found that this
claim was not to be construed as diplomatic protection stricto sensu.
For this reason, the Court affirmed that there was no need to comply
with the rule of previous exhaustion of local remedies. The relevant
(70) Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J. Publications, Series A, No. 2, p.
12. See also Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1955, p. 24.
(71) AMERASINGHE, Diplomatic Protection, Oxford, 2008.
(72) CONDORELLI, Protection diplomatique réussie et réparation due: une glose, in
Unité et diversité du droit international - Ecrits en l’honneur du Professeur Pierre-Marie
Dupuy (Alland, Chetail, de Frouville e Vinuales eds.), Leiden, 2014, p. 480.
(73) GAJA, Quel préjudice pour un État qui exerce la protection diplomatique?,
ibidem, p. 487.
(74) VERMEER-KÜNZLI, As if: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection, European
Journal of Int. Law, 2007, p. 68.
(75) PELLET, La seconde mort d’Euripide Mavrommatis (1)? Notes sur le projet de
la C.D.I. sur la protection diplomatique, in Droit du pouvoir, Pouvoir du droit. Mélanges
offerts à Jean Salmon, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 1359 ff.
(76) Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. United States
of America), I.C.J. Reports, 2004, p. 12, para. 40.
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passage, albeit laconic, suggests that the State of nationality may bring
a direct claim for an injury suffered by itself in addition to a claim based
on diplomatic protection (77). In this case, the claims involved are
conceptually and legally different and should be dealt with under
distinct headings.
However, by distinguishing possible direct claims of the State from
diplomatic protection stricto sensu, the Avena judgement implies that
when States exercise diplomatic protection, they normally act on behalf
of their citizens. This is confirmed by the RDC v. Uganda case, where
the Court assumed that the counter-claim of Uganda concerning the
violation of the international minimum standard of its nationals related
to an “injury to the particular individuals in question and did not relate
to a violation of an international obligation by the DRC causing a direct
injury to Uganda” (78). This assumption was made independently from
a particular characterization of the claim by the State. The Court went
on affirming that Uganda was attempting to exercise diplomatic pro-
tection with regard to its nationals and should have met the conditions
necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection as recognized in
general international law, in particular the requirement of Ugandan
nationality and the prior exhaustion of local remedies.
A general evaluation of the recent jurisprudence of the Court,
therefore, suggests that diplomatic protection regards injuries suffered
by individuals that the national States may vindicate in front of the
Court on behalf of their citizens. Consequently, the individuals them-
selves should be regarded as the holders of the right to reparation.
At the same time, this does not rule out that a State may invoke, in
addition, its own right to receive compensation for damages suffered in
connection with the violation of rights of its citizens. This may occur,
for example, in case of multiple and continuous violations only target-
ing its citizens and therefore amounting to a disguised discrimination,
as the State may consider to have suffered a moral damage. Instead, it
is difficult to argue that the State of nationality may suffer economic
damages from the violation of the right to property of its citizens. In the
Barcelona Traction case, for example, the ICJ questioned whether the
injury caused to the investors of a certain State directly involves the
economic interest of the latter, since such investments are part of its
(77) See MILANO, Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Re-fashioning Tradition?, cit., p. 129.
(78) Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, cit., para. 333.
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national economic resources (79). In the end, the Court did not uphold
this view and concluded that this construction is “quite different from
and outside the field of diplomatic protection” (80).
The qualification of the State exercising diplomatic protection as a
legal representative of the injured individuals might call into question
the relationship between diplomatic protection and other additional
complaints concerning the same injuries.
As the ECHR practice shows, a State’s claim could be made in
addition to individuals’ applications relating to the same facts. This
might cause a multiplication of cases involving the same injuries (81).
The two Ukraine v. Russia cases are paradigmatic: there are currently
256 individual applications lodged against both Ukraine and Russia for
the same violations to which the inter-State case before the Court
refers (82). Although the applicants are not the same, the object of the
case and the alleged wrongful acts are identical.
Multiplication of claims may occur also in case of direct claims of
States involving injuries suffered by individuals (83). In the recent “The
Arctic Sunrise” case, for example, the claims brought by the Nether-
lands on behalf of the ship, its owners, the crew and other people on
board were considered to be “direct claims” of the Netherlands. Under
the arbitral award, the Netherlands have been entitled to compensation
also in relation to the arrest, detention and prosecution of the people
on board, considered as part of the ship. On March 2014, the activists
submitted a complaint to the European Court requesting remedies for
the violation of article 13 (freedom of expression) and article 5
(prohibition of unlawful detention) of the European Convention con-
(79) See BOLLECKER-STERN, Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité inter-
nationale, Paris, 1973, p. 101.
(80) Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, I.C.J. Reports, 1970,
p. 46, paras. 86-87.
(81) GAJA, The Protection of General Interests in the International Community,
Recueil des cours, vol. 364 (2014), p. 169.
(82) Http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2015/04/russia-court-extends-crimea-
and-eastern-ukraine-case-deadline/.
(83) “The Arctic Sunrise” case concerned measures taken by the Russian Fed-
eration against a vessel flying the flag of the Netherlands operated by campaigners of
Greenpeace protesting against oil drilling operations in Arctic waters (Arctic Sunrise
(Netherland v. Russia), Award of 14 August 2015, http://www.pcacases.com/
web/sendAttach/1438, accessed 21 January 2014). Although technically this is not a
case of diplomatic protection, it raises similar issues. On this point, see the comment
of HARRISON, Current Legal Developments. The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands
v. Russia), Int. Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law, 2016, p. 145 ss.
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cerning the same facts for which compensation had been already
awarded by the arbitral tribunal (84).
Interpreting diplomatic protection as an instrument for the pro-
tection of individuals theoretically excludes the need for parallel claims
concerning the same injuries. Once the rights involved in diplomatic
protection are qualified as rights of individuals, there is no theoretical
obstacle to consider that the State acts on behalf of its nationals and for
their benefit. In any case, individuals should be properly involved in the
proceedings and in the possible settlement of the case, in order to
exclude the need for concurrent claims.
7. The theory of diplomatic protection was premised on the
traditional approach assuming that international law addresses the
relationships among States without affecting the legal position of
individuals. However, this construction needs to be updated. Although
it is still correct that international law mostly governs the conduct of
States, there are certain fields where not only international rules give
rise to individual rights, but also those rights have shaped (or reshaped)
the content of secondary rules on State responsibility. This is what
happened to the law on the treatment of aliens where the prominence
of the position of individuals and the incidence of human rights law
have contributed to redirect the function of diplomatic protection in
favour of individuals, moulding their right to receive compensation.
In the draft articles on diplomatic protection, the question of the
right to receive compensation was blurred with the principle according
to which States retain the discretionary power to act for the protection
of their nationals. However, the two questions should be logically
distinguished. A discretion of States to exercise diplomatic protection
does not entail that diplomatic protection only consists in a claim by a
State. The present analysis has highlighted that recent practice and
jurisprudence reflect a more complex understanding of the relationship
between the States of nationality and aggrieved individuals, based on
the progressive acceptance that individuals hold a right to receive
compensation in case of successful diplomatic protection.
Theoretically, the role of national States flows from the “asymmet-
ric” evolution of international law whereby the emergence of individual
rights is not always accompanied by procedural guarantees and rem-
edies. Therefore, States may act in protection of their nationals to
overcome the lack of specific remedies. Coherently, when those rem-
(84) See para. 394 of the award.
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edies are instead available, such as in the context of certain human
rights treaties, compensation is always awarded to the individuals or —
in case of inter-states complaints — for their benefit.
Therefore, once national States decide to exercise diplomatic
protection, individuals may claim a share of compensation and should
not be prejudiced by a settlement that they have not accepted. This also
implies that, in case of a waiver by a State of its claim, the aggrieved
individuals that have not been compensated should remain entitled to
claim reparation, by taking advantage of all the procedural opportuni-
ties available at the current stage of development of international law.
DEBORAH RUSSO
Abstract. — This paper discusses the right of individuals to receive compensation
for injuries suffered in consequence of an internationally wrongful act. Analysing recent
practice, it argues that the duty of States to provide for compensation for the benefit
of individuals has developed with the progressive recognition of diplomatic protection
as a procedural instrument to vindicate violations of rights pertaining to individuals.
According to the paper, State discretion to act in protection of its nationals does not
exclude that, once the State chooses to exercise diplomatic protection, the function of
protection is exercised on behalf of the individuals. Therefore, the State cannot waive
a claim without the express or tacit acceptance of the injured individuals. Individuals
who have not benefited from any settlement can always claim compensation by taking
advantage of all procedural opportunities available at the current stage of development
of international law.
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